Wednesday, January 23, 2019

Argument from Producibility

Duns Scouts: Argument from Producibility. John Duns Scotus (1265?-1308?) modified the Cosmological Argument of Aquinas in two important ways. First, he began with the producibility
of being, not merely with produced beings. Second, he amplified on the the argument against an infinite regress of dependent causes.

1) Being produced (i.e., being come into being). This is learned through experience (by observing
being produced), but it is also true independent of experience (i.e., it would be true of beings that do not exist). It would be true, even if God had not willed to to create anything.

2) What is produced is producible, either by itself, by nothing or by something else.

3) But no being can produce itself. In order to cause its own existence, it would have to exist prior to its own existence.

4) Neither can something be caused by nothing. This is contradictory.

5) Therefore, being producible only some being that is productive. Only being can produce beings.

6) There cannot be an infinite regress of productive beings, each producing the being of the one following it, because
A) This is an essentially related, not an accidentally related, series of causes (1) where the primary cause is more near perfect than the secondary, (2) where the secondary cause depends on the primary
for its very causality and (3) where the cause must be simultaneous to the effect.
B) An infinite series of essentially related causes is impossible, because, (1) if the whole series is dependent for its causality (every cause depending on a prior cause), then there must be something
beyond the series that accounts for the causality in the series. (2) If an infinite series were causing the effect, then there would have to be an infinite number of causes simultaneously, causing a single effect. This is impossible. There cannot be an actual infinite number in a series, for it is always possible to add one more to any number. (3) Wherever there are prior causes, there must be a prime (first) cause.  One cause would no be nearer to the beginning than any other unless there is a beginning. (4) Higher causes are more nearly perfect than lower causes and this implies a perfect Cause at the head of all less-than perfect causes. (5) An infinite regress of causes implies imperfection, since each cause lacks the ability to explain the succeeding causes. But an imperfect series implies something perfect beyond the series as ground for the imperfect.

7) Therefore, there must be a first, productive Cause of al producible beings.

8) The First Cause of all producible beings must be one,  because
A) It is perfect in knowledge, and there cannot be tow beings that know everything perfectly, for one would know itself more completely than would the other.
B) It is perfect in will; hence; it loves itself more completely than it loves anything else, which means
that the other would the other.
C) It is infinitely good, and there cannot be two infinitely good beings, for then there would be more than an infinite good, and this is impossible since there cannot be more the most.
D) It is infinite in power. If there were two that there would be two total primary causes fo the same effect, and this is impossible, since that cannot be two causes each doing all the causing.
E) Absolute infinite cannot be excelled in perfection, since there cannot be a more perfect than the wholly Perfect.
F) There cannot be two Necessary Beings, for to differ, one would have to have some perfection the other lacked (if there is no real difference, they do not really differ). But whatever a Necessary Being has, it must have necessarily would not be a Necessary Being.
G) Omnipotent will cannot be in two beings, for then one could render impotent what the other wills omnipotently. Even if they agreed not to hinder each other, they would still be incompatible, for each would be the total primary (and direct) cause of any given thing that they agreed should exist. But an omnipotent Cause must be the total primary (and direct) Cause fo what it wills. The cause agreeing to, but not directly willing, the effect would be only the indirect cause and hence not the direct (omnipotent) Cause of the effect.




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